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AVIATION LAW REPORT
CAm E. B. MCKENRY*
This report reviews recent litigation under the Warsaw Con-
vention of 1929.1 The most important litigation deals with the lia-
bility limitation in the calculation of damages under Article 22 of
the Convention. This litigation has arisen because of monetary de-
velopments since 1929 which have altered the value of gold.
The first three provisions of Article 22 relate to the limitation
on the amount of recovery, valued in French francs, in the case of
injury to passengers, checked baggage and goods, and hand articles
carried aboard.2 The fourth provision of Article 22 provides for a
conversion standard: "(4) The sums mentioned shall be deemed to
refer to the French franc consisting of 651/2 milligrams of gold at
the standard of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums
may be converted into any national currency in round figures." 3
This standard presented no difficulties for nearly fifty years.
Monetary developments since 1929, however, have made it difficult
to determine the appropriate conversion rate under Article 22. In
1929, an ounce of gold was worth approximately twenty U.S. dol-
lars. In 1934, the United States established an official gold price of
thirty-five dollars an ounce because of the devaluation of the dol-
lar. This official gold price remained in effect until the establish-
ment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1944. United
States' action, both individually and as a party, to certain IMF
agreements resulted in abolishing a fixed "official" price of gold
against the dollar. The consequence of releasing the fixed price of
gold is that the free-market price of gold has fluctuated against the
U.S. dollar.'
* Dean, School of Business Administration, University of Miami, A.B., 1949, University
of Miami; J.D., 1954, University of Miami; LL.M., 1962, University of Miami; LL.M., 1965,
New York University.
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air (Warsaw Convention of 1929) 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, U.S. adopted
July 31, 1934.
2. Warsaw Convention, Article 22(1)(2) and (3), supra, note 1.
3. Warsaw Convention, Article 22(4), supra, note 1.
4. For a comprehensive review of the events leading up to the present released or "free
market" relationship of gold to the U.S. dollar, see Boehringer Mannhein Diagnostics, Inc.
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When the United States abandoned its official price for gold,
however, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) took no action to re-
quire revised tariffs. The practical effect is that during a time in
which the free-market price of gold has risen to more than $400 an
ounce, the CAB has allowed airline carriers to calculate their limi-
tation of liability based on the artificial figure of $42.22 an ounce
which was once the U.S. "official price."
The limitation of the carrier's liability for damages as set out
in Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, 250 French gold francs
per kilogram, can be converted to U.S. dollars with reference to
four different standards: (1) the free-market price of gold, (2) the
last official price of gold in the United States ($42.22 per ounce),
(3) the Special Drawing Right (SDR) used by IMF members as a
unit of account, or (4) the exchange value of the current French
franc.
A. The "Gold" Cases
Three U.S. District Court cases were reported in late 1981 and
early 1982 touching upon the appropriate conversion rate to be uti-
lized under Article 22 of the Convention.5
In Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics Inc. v. Pan American
World Airways,6 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Texas, in an action for damages to a cargo shipment, ruled that
the conversion of the amount of damages to U.S. dollars should be
with reference to the current free market price of gold. However, in
Franklin Mint Corp. et at v. Trans World Airlines,7 the Southern
District of New York, in the case of a lost shipment of four bags of
valuable coins, ruled that in converting the Warsaw limitation into
U.S. dollars, the last official price of gold in the United States, and
not the current market price is the appropriate measure. The most
recent case to be reported was a wrongful death action under the
Warsaw limitation, In Re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland,
On March 14, 1980.8 The court, after citing both of the above cargo
v. Pan American World Airways, 531 F. Supp 344 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
5. Franklin Mint Corp. v. T.W.A., 525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D. N.Y. 1981), 16 AVI 18,024;
Boehringer Mannhein Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways; 531 F. Supp. 344
(S.D. Tex. 1981), 16 AVI 18,177; In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14,
1980; February 16, 1982 (E.D. N.Y.), 16 AVI 18,249.
6. 531 F.Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex 1981).
7. 525 F.Supp. 1288 (S.D. N.Y. 1981).
8. 16 AVI 18,249 (E.D. N.Y. 1982).
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cases, elected to follow the Franklin Mint choice utilizing the last
official price of gold. An additional complication in this wrongful
death action was the application of the Montreal Agreement. The
Montreal Agreement does not apply to cargo and baggage and was
established as a device to avoid the lower limitation on recovery in
exchange for the United States withdrawing its denunciation of the
Convention." The Montreal Agreement operates under Article 22
(1)10 which allows the passenger and the carrier by special contract
to agree to a higher limit of liability. The Montreal Agreement lim-
its the amount of liability to $75,000 U.S. dollars. Article 23, how-
ever, provides in part: "Any provision tending to relieve the carrier
of liability or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in
this convention shall be null and void .. ."I'
Thus, if a free market standard for gold is selected in a pas-
senger case, it will, in all probability, result in a recovery in excess
of the Montreal limit of $75,000, thereby negating the Montreal
Agreement's application because such application would constitute
a violation of Article 23. Undoubtedly, the Boehringer case will
come under review by the fifth circuit and the New York cases by
the second circuit, perhaps paving the way for an ultimate Su-
preme Court review if each circuit elects to support their respec-
tive trial courts.
B. Guatemala City Protocol
Several non-U.S. courts have addressed the gold conversion is-
sue but have not bebn consistent in result. " The second circuit
touched briefly on this issue by way of dicta in Reed v. Wiser,'8
but not in a manner dispositive of the issue. The court noted that
under Article VIII of the Guatemala City Protocol to the Warsaw
Convention "drafted at the insistence of the United States and
9. For full consideration of the Montreal Agreement and events leading up to its estab-
lishment, see Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 HARVARD LAw REv. 497 (1967).
10. Supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. See Hornlinie v. Soci~th Nationale des Petroles Aquitaine, Decision of April 14,
1972 (N.J. 1972, 269) (Dutch High Council holding that the official price of gold should be
used in applying the analogous limitation provisions of Shipowners' Liability Convention).
See also Heller, The Value of the Gold Franc - A Different Point of View, 6 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 73, 101-02 (1974).
13. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977), 14
Air 17.
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still awaiting consideration by the (U.S.) Senate" the liability lim-
its per passenger, based upon a then (1977) free market U.S. dollar
value of $152.00 per ounce, would rise to over $400,000 (US).'
4
This reasoning was based upon the amended language of Article 22
(4) of the Convention, which would be provided by Article VIII of
the Guatemala City Protocol:
Art. 22(4). The sums mentioned in francs in this Article and Ar-
ticle 42 shall be deemed to refer to a currency unit consisting of
sixty-five and a half milligrammes of gold of millesimal fineness
nine hundred. These sums may be converted into national cur-
rencies in round figures. Conversion of the sums into national
currencies other than gold shall, in case of judicial proceedings,
be made according to the gold value of such currencies at the
date of the judgment."5
The fact that the second circuit in Reed v. Wiser has viewed the
Guatemala City Protocol as changing (i.e., raising) the liability
limit suggests, although admittedly speculative, that it will view
the present Article 22 limits as providing a conversion other than a
free market standard of gold against the U.S. dollar. This specula-
tion is further reinforced by the additional observation in Reed v.
Wiser: "Nevertheless, at no time has this country ever abandoned
the basic principle that, whatever the limits may be, air carriers
should be protected from having to pay out more than a fixed and
definite sum for passenger injuries sustained in international air
disasters."' 6 The uniform application by U.S. courts of a free mar-
ket standard for gold in interpreting Article 22 (4) could effectively
remove the liability limitations of that Article in most cases, since
recoveries could approach non-Warsaw verdicts even in the U.S.
Moreover, a standard which fluctuates with the vicissitudes of the
world gold markets and which results in the immediate increasing
of a $75,000.00 (US) limit on passenger liability under the Mon-
treal Agreement to over one million dollars (based upon a free
market value of gold at between $300.00 and $400.00 per ounce)
can hardly be considered as fixed and definite.
Although it may be interpreted as providing a free market
14. Id. at 1089. See supra note 12.
15. Protocol to amend the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to
international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as amended by the proto-
col done at the Hague on 28 September 1955. Signed March 8, 1971 at Guatemala City,
Guatemala.
16. 555 F.2d at 1089.
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standard for gold vis-&-vis liability limitation, the Guatemala City
Protocol recognizes the need for review of the limitation amount,
by providing a review of passenger liability limits on a periodic ba-
sis through a new Article 42, which would specify convening a con-
ference to review the limits established in revised Article 22 (1) (a)
which covers the carriage of persons. These reviews would take
place during the fifth and tenth years after the Protocol entered
into force.1
7
C. Montreal Protocols Nos. 3 & 418
Another solution is provided in the Montreal Protocols No. 3
and No. 4 to the Convention which were subsequent to the Guate-
mala City Protocol. Rather than reference to a French franc or
other national monetary unit, the Montreal Protocols use the IMF
"Special Drawing Rights." For example, Montreal Protocol No. 3
provides in Article II for a complete change in the Warsaw Con-
vention's Article 22 including the following:
17. Article XV in the Guatemala City Protocol provides:
After Article 41 of the Convention, the following Article shall be inserted:-Arti-
cle 42 - 1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 41, Conferences of the
Parties to the Protocol done at Guatemala City on the eighth March 1971 shall
be convened during the fifth and tenth years respectively after the date of entry
into force of the said Protocol for the purpose of reviewing the limit established
in Article 22, paragraph 1 a) of the Convention as amended by that Protocol. 2.
At each of the Conferences mentioned in paragraph I of this Article the limit of
liability in Article 22, paragraph 1 a) in force at the respective dates of these
Conferences shall not be increased by an amount exceeding one hundred and
eighty-seven thousand five hundred francs. 3. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Ar-
ticle, unless before the thirty-first December of the fifth and tenth years after
the date of entry into force of the Protocol referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article the aforesaid Conferences decide otherwise by a two-thirds majority vote
of the Parties present and voting, the limit of liability in Article 22, paragraph 1
a) in force at the respective dates of these Conferences shall on those dates be
increased by one hundred and eighty-seven thousand five hundred francs.* 4.
The applicable limit shall be that which, in accordance with the preceding
paragraphs, is in effect on the date of the event which caused the death or per-
sonal injury of the passenger.
*[I.e., 1.5 x Warsaw or just under U.S. $12,500.1
18. Montreal Protocols No. 3 and 4 1975, Montreal Protocol No. 3 - To Amend the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air.
Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended by the Protocols Done at The Hague on
28 September 1955, and at Guatemala City on 8 March 1971. Montreal Protocol No. 4 - To
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Car-
riage by Air Signed at Warsaw on October 21, 1929, as Amended by the Protocol, Done at
The Hague on September 28, 1955. Both Protocols signed on September 25, 1975 at Mon-
treal, Canada.
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4. The sums mentioned in terms of Special Drawing Right in
this Article and Article 42 shall be deemed to refer to the Spe-
cial Drawing Right as defined by the International Monetary
Fund Conversion of the sums into national currencies shall, in
case of judicial proceedings, be made according to the value of
such currencies in terms of the Special Drawing Right at the
date of the judgment. The value of a national currency, in terms
of the Special Drawing Right, of a High Contracting Party
which is a Member of the International Monetary Fund, shall be
calculated in accordance with the method of valuation applied
by the International Monetary Fund, in effect at the date of the
judgment, for its operations and transactions. The value of a na-
tional currency, in terms of the Special Drawing Right, of a High
Contracting Party which is not a Member of the International
Monetary Fund, shall be calculated in a manner determined by
that High Contracting Party.
Nevertheless, those States which are not Members of the
International Monetary Fund and whose law does not permit
the application of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2(a) of Ar-
ticle 22 may, at the time of ratification or accession or at any
time thereafter, declare that the limit of liability of the carrier
in judicial proceedings in their territories is fixed at a sum of
1,500,000 monetary units per passenger with respect to para-
graph 1(a) of Article 22; 62,500 monetary units per passenger
with respect to paragraph 1(b) of Article 22; 15,000 monetary
units per passenger with respect to paragraph 1(c) of Article 22;
and 250 monetary units per kilogramme with respect to para-
graph 2(a) of Article 22. A State applying the provisions of this
paragraph may also declare that the sum referred to in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 42 shall be the sum of 187,500
monetary units. This monetary unit corresponds to sixty-five
and a half milligrammes of gold of millesimal fineness nine hun-
dred. These sums may be converted into the national currency
concerned in round figures. The conversion of these sums into
national currency shall be made according to the law of the
State concerned. 1'
Montreal No. 4 is somewhat different but nonetheless follows
the concept of Special Drawing Rights as the measure of conver-
sion to be used. ° However, anything approaching universal accept-
19. Montreal Protocol No. 3, Article II.
20. Any detailed consideration of the complex relationships between Montreal Protocol
No. 3 and No. 4 is beyond the scope of this Report. Both were signed on September 25, 1975
at Montreal, but there are substantial differences between the two. For example, Montreal
No. 3 is designed to include the Guatemala City Protocol. Its revisions to Article 22 of the
[Vol. 14
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ance by major air traffic countries of one or more of the Protocols
to the Warsaw Convention in the immediate future is doubtful at
best, particularly in the case of the United States."1
Therefore, it rests squarely upon the U.S. Court of Appeals
(and perhaps eventually the U.S. Supreme Court), at least at this
writing, to determine which of the four possible standards to use in
interpreting the limitation conversion under Article 22(4).
Convention are based upon the previous changes brought about by Guatemala City. On the
other hand, Montreal No. 4 excludes Guatemala City, and bases its revisions on the previous
changes of The Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention signed September 28, 1955. The
equivalent of the Special Drawing Rights provision quoted in the body of this report from
Montreal No. 3 is revision Article 22(b) to the Convention:
In Article 22 of the Convention-6. The sums mentioned in the terms of the Spe-
cial Drawing Right in this Article shall be deemed to refer to the Special Draw-
ing Right as defined by the International Monetary Fund. Conversion of the
sums into national currencies shall, in case of judicial proceedings, be made ac-
cording to the value of such currencies in terms of the Special Drawing Right at
the date of the judgment. The value of a national currency, in terms of the Spe-
cial Drawing Right, of a High Contracting Party which is a Member of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, shall be calculated in accordance with the method of
valuation applied by the International Monetary Fund, in effect at the date of
the judgment, for its operations and transactions. The value of a national cur-
rency, in terms of the Special Drawing Right, of a High Contracting Party which
is not a Member of the International Monetary Fund, shall be calculated in a
manner determined by that High Contracting Party.
Nevertheless, those States which are not Members of the International
Monetary Fund and whose law does not permit the application of the provisions
of paragraph 2(b) of Article 22 may, at the time of ratification or accession or at
any time thereafter, declare that the limit of liability of the carrier in judicial
proceedings in their territories is fixed at a sum of two hundred and fifty mone-
tary units per kilogramme. This monetary unit corresponds to sixty-five and a
half milligrammes of gold or millesimal fineness nine hundred. This sum may be
converted into the national currency concerned in round figures. The conversion
of this sum into the national currency shall be made according to the law of the
State concerned.
21. Aside from the Montreal Protocols the possible judicial interpretation of the origi-
nal Article 22(4) of the Warsaw Convention as allowing the use with IMF member nations of
the Special Drawing Rights concept is not remote. Judge Knapp noted in Franklin Mint:
"Were we writing on a clean slate, we would find the argument in favor of the first of TWA's
suggestions (the Special Drawing Rights) most persuasive." 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289, supra,
note 5.
